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Dimensions of Equality in Regulating Assisted
Reproductive Technologies
Mary Crossley*

I. INTRODUCTION

Although concerns about individual liberty and the nature and extent of
reproductive freedom have tended to dominate discussions regarding the
proliferation of and access to reproductive technologies, questions about the
implications of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTS) for equality have
also arisen. Indeed, someone attuned to listening for equality concerns
realizes that these questions crop up quite frequently in discussions
regarding assisted reproduction.
Moreover, the bases for potential inequality are quite diverse; in some
instances the development of ARTs is touted as ameliorating existing
inequalities, while in others it is suspected of exacerbating those
inequalities. For example, the website of a purveyor of egg-freezing services
suggests that technology has the potential to equalize women's position visA-vis men's in the reproductive project-at least in part-by muffling the
ticking of women's so-called biological clock.' By contrast, critics of
surrogacy, or pregnancy contracts, in the 1980s and 1990s often warned that
acceptance of the practice of surrogacy could worsen gender and social
inequality by contributing to the development of a "breeder class" of poor
women whose reproductive capacity would be coercively appropriated by
wealthier couples seeking to acquire children. 2 From yet another
perspective, the development of ARTs has been described as creating an
opportunity for the equal legal treatment of persons seeking to create a
family, whether they do so simply by engaging in sexual intercourse or by
3
the use of ARTs.

Dean and Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law
1. The Extend Fertility website states: "As women, we lead rich and demanding lives ....
Egg Freezing offers women planning to have children after the age of 35 the opportunity to
effectively slow down their biological clocks." Extend Fertility, Why Freeze Eggs, http://www.
extendfertility.com/why/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2005).
2.

See, e.g., MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 25 (1988).

3.

See John A. Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Family, 47 HASTINGS

The Journalof Gender,Race & Justice

[9:2005]

Despite the high number of invocations of equality in the literature
regarding ARTs, to date little effort has been made to comprehensively
examine the implications of ARTs for equality. While this short Article does
not seek to accomplish such a comprehensive examination, it has the more
modest aim of fostering future discussion. The Article thus seeks to
highlight the variety of equality issues that ARTs4 present and to develop a
framework for classifying different types of equality issues. Specifically, I
suggest that three different types of equality concerns exist relevant to
discussions about regulating ARTs: equality of access to ARTs (and thus
parenthood), equal treatment in the resolution of disputes arising from the
use of ARTs, and equality issues raised by trait-selection practices. My
point herein is neither to condemn nor to rationalize the inequalities that
close examination may reveal. This Article instead issues a challenge to
scholars in the field to undertake a broader, more thorough consideration of
the implications for equality that the development of, and regulation or nonregulation of, ARTs present.
II. EQUALITY OF ACCESS

TO

ARTs

A variety of circumstances can function to impede or deny access to
ARTs for some individuals seeking to have children. Denials may result
from providers' decisions about whom they will serve, from legal rules
establishing the availability of ARTs and the legal treatment of participants
in ARTs, or from disparities in insurance coverage or financial wherewithal.
An assortment of questions posed by inequalities in access to ARTs have
already received some attention by scholars and policy makers. Part II,
however, seeks to highlight some of the issues raised by access inequalities.
A. Access Inequality Based on ParticipantStatus
A number of personal characteristics may affect the likelihood that
individuals seeking to use reproductive technologies will successfully find a
medical provider willing to provide services to them. Not surprisingly, some
of these characteristics, such as sexual orientation or disability, are traits
that may be likely to lead to social or economic disadvantage more
L.J. 911, 913 (1996) (asserting that the "family project," whatever the method of conception,
"should be treated equally" in each case).
4. This Article uses the term "assisted reproductive technology" (ART) broadly to include
not only those technologies that assist prospective parents in achieving pregnancy, but also those
technologies that parents use to make decisions about whether to proceed with or terminate the
reproductive project. Thus, the final Part will consider the equality implications of trait-selection
practices, which may or may not be used in conjunction with in vitro fertilization (IVF) or other
methods of conception assistance.
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generally. Others, such as marital status or procreative capacity, by contrast,
may produce inequality particular to the context of seeking technological
assistance in reproducing.
A recent study suggests the role that provider screening may play in
creating inequities in access to ARTs. 5 Researchers surveyed fertility clinics
in the United States to determine clinics' beliefs about and practices for
screening prospective patients and found substantial variation in the
practices reported by clinics. 6 A key value shared by most clinics, however,
is the belief that ART programs have both the right and the responsibility to
screen candidates in order to avoid assisting individuals who are deemed to
be unfit as prospective parents to conceive a child.7 Reflecting this belief, a
substantial proportion of reproductive technology programs reported that
they would be likely to turn away hypothetical candidates with particular
attributes. 8 While the researchers acknowledged that it is unclear whether
the clinics would actually turn away such candidates (particularly in light of
the fact that many programs do not collect information regarding attributes
they consider relevant), 9 the results described below certainly suggest cause
for concern regarding potential inequalities in access.
One basis on which substantial numbers of clinics reported a likelihood
of turning away candidates was the candidate's desire to parent singly.
Many clinics indicated a reluctance to provide ART services to single
persons, but this reluctance was imbalanced across gender lines.'" While
twenty percent of programs said that they would be very or extremely likely
to turn away a woman without a husband or partner, fifty-three percent
reached the same conclusion for a man who sought services without a wife
or a partner." Thus, clinic personnel's beliefs regarding the ability of
individuals to parent singly may pose a real barrier to single persons seeking
assistance in reproducing.
While many programs apparently believe that one parent is not enough,
the presence of two individuals seeking ART services does not guarantee a
judgment of parental suitability if the couple is gay or lesbian. The
percentage of clinics reporting an unwillingness to provide services to gay
5.

See generally Andrea D. Gurmankin et al., Screening Practices and Beliefs of Assisted

Reproductive Technology Programs,83 FERTILITY & STERILITY 61 (2005).
6.

Id. at 65-66.

7.

Id. at 64-65.

8.

Id.at 65.

9.

Id.at 65-66.

10.

Id. at65.

11.

Gurmankin et al., supra note 5, at 65.
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or lesbian couples is nearly as high as the percentage unwilling to provide
12
services to single parents, and it is similarly divided along gender lines.
Reports of providers refusing to provide ART services to gays and lesbians
are not uncommon, 13 and they tend to confirm the existence of inequality

between heterosexual couples and homosexual couples who seek medical
assistance in bearing a child.
Another type of information relevant to clinics' decisions to provide

ART services is the prospective parent's health or disability status. This is
particularly true with respect to women infected with human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) who seek ART services; more than half of
the programs responding to the survey indicated that they would be unlikely
to provide services to HIV-positive women. 14 This finding is consistent with

Professor Carl Coleman's research, which suggests that refusals to provide
ART services to individuals infected with HIV may constitute a form of

disability discrimination. 15 Coleman, however, also points to evidence that
medical providers may screen out prospective patients based on other health

conditions or disabilities. 16 The recent study of ART programs provides
further support for Coleman's conclusions, finding that providers attached
varying degrees of importance to conditions including a prospective
mother's severe diabetes (causing pregnancy to carry a ten percent risk of
maternal death), a prospective mother's bipolar disorder, and "limited
7
intellectual capacity" or blindness of both prospective parents.'

12. Forty-eight percent of the programs reported that they would be very or extremely likely
to turn away a gay couple who sought to have a child through a surrogacy arrangement, with one of
the men as the sperm source; seventeen percent indicated that they would be very or extremely
likely to turn away a lesbian couple who sought to use donor insemination. Id. at 65.
13. See, e.g., Peter Y. Hong, Lesbian Sues Over Physician's Refusal to Do Insemination,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2003, at B6. At the same time, however, some providers of ART services have
recognized gays' and lesbians' unmet demand for services and have chosen to cater to that market.
See, e.g., Sandra G. Boodman, Fatherhood by a New Formula, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2005,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlac2/wp-dyn/A16533-2005JanI7?language=printer
(describing a law firm that serves as a broker, recruiting egg donors and surrogates for
nontraditional parents).
14.

Gurmankin et al., supra note 5, at 65.

15. Carl H. Coleman, Conceiving Harm: DisabilityDiscriminationin Assisted Reproductive
Technology, 50 UCLA L. REV. 17, 31-43 (2002).
16.

Id. at 29-31.

17. The respective percentages of programs reporting that they would be very or extremely
likely to turn away candidates with specific conditions are as follows: severe maternal diabetes
(55%), maternal bipolar disorder (13%), limited intellectual capacity of both members of the couple
(15%), and blindness of both members of the couple (3%). Gurmankin et al., supra note 5, at 65. It
is interesting that the survey specified that the blind prospective parents were blind from an
accident, rather than congenitally blind. Presumably this reflects an effort to focus the inquiry on
perceptions of the fitness of prospective parents, rather than on eugenic concerns about the
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Although this recent study supports a conclusion that the patient
screening practices of ART programs may produce some troubling
inequalities among patients in access to ART services, provider screening is
not alone in contributing to inequalities. A number of laws and regulations
may also impede access for individuals with particular characteristics. For
example, a recently implemented FDA rule advises sperm banks not to
accept anonymous donations from men who have had sex with another man
within the previous five years 8 and thus may limit the ability of gay men to
19
serve as donors for women or couples seeking to achieve a pregnancy.
In contrast to the regulatory limits on gay sperm donors, other laws
regulating access to ARTs do not tend to flatly prohibit the use of ARTs by
specific groups. Instead, they prevent some individuals from claiming legal
protections relating to the parentage of children born as a result of the use of
ARTs and from enforcing related contractual arrangements. For example,
the original version of the Uniform Parentage Act included a provision that
established parentage for children born from donor insemination, but that
provision applied only when a married woman received donor insemination
with her husband's consent. 20 Thus, the law failed to resolve parentage
issues for both single women who underwent donor insemination and their
sperm donors. Similarly, some state laws authorize the enforcement of
surrogate parenting agreements only if the intended mother is infertile or
otherwise unable to carry a pregnancy to term without undue risk. 2 1 These
laws effectively deprive women who wish to enter into surrogacy
arrangements for reasons other than infertility or pregnancy-related health
risks of the ability to enter into legally enforceable agreements.
Of course, any favoring of infertile persons that results from laws
limiting the enforceability of surrogacy contracts pales in comparison to the
fundamental inequality between fertile persons and infertile persons. Such
inequity flows from efforts, whether public or private, to limit access to
ARTs based on the personal attributes of individuals seeking to employ

transmission of genetic disability.
18. See FDA to Implement Guidelines Banning Men Who Have Sex with Men from Donating
Sperm Because of Perceived HIV Risk, KAISER DAILY REPROD. HEALTH REP., May 6, 2005,
available at http://www.kaisemetwork.org/daily-reports/rep-index.cfm?hint- 1&DRID=29881.
19. Id. The FDA's rules, however, contain an exception that allows men who have had sex
with men to make sperm donations to friends or family members. Id.
20.

See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b) (1973).

21.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (2005) (authorizing binding and enforceable
gestational surrogacy contract only when the commissioning mother cannot physically gestate a
pregnancy to term or the gestation would cause a risk to the physical health of the commissioning
mother or fetus); see generally Robin Fretwell Wilson, Uncovering the Rationale for Requiring
Infertility in Surrogacy Arrangements, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 337 (2003).
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ART services to conceive a child. Restrictions on access to ARTs create a

double standard for becoming a parent.22 Those individuals who are able to
conceive a child in the "usual and customary manner" 23 are not subject to
scrutiny regarding their fitness to parent, while those who are infertile 24 may
be blocked in their efforts to achieve parenthood by the fitness judgments of
medical providers or policy makers. While some fitness judgments may be
widely accepted, others may tend to reflect suspect biases, and any
25
imposition of such judgments may create a slippery slope.
B. Access Inequality Based on Insurance Coverage and Finances

So far, this Article has focused on status inequalities in access to ART
services: in other words, disparities in access based on personal
characteristics of the individual seeking the services. Because of the high
monetary cost, however, financial constraints may also produce serious

disparities in the ability to receive ART services. A single cycle of in vitro
fertilization typically costs approximately $10,000,26 and multiple cycles
may be necessary to achieve a single pregnancy. Because most private

insurance policies do not provide coverage for ART services, patients
typically must bear the costs of the services themselves. 27 As a result,

financial inequality in access to ARTs is likely to track financial inequality
in society. Those with high incomes or significant assets allowing them to
incur debt are able to finance services, while those with lower incomes and

more meager assets are not.
Moreover, an argument can be made that insurers' decisions to exclude
coverage for ART services produce inequality. If we understand ART

22.
exists).

See Gurmankin et al., supra note 5, at 62 (noting that a "dual standard for parenthood"

23. See Budnick v. Silverman, 805 So.2d 1112, 1114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)
("Impregnation by the 'usual and customary manner' has been around long enough so that it does
not constitute 'reproductive technology."').
24. The term "infertile" refers to a larger group of persons than might be expected, since it
does not necessarily connote an absolute inability to achieve pregnancy, but instead refers to a
couple's failure to conceive after a full year of engaging in sex without using contraception. See
Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated Biomedical
Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REv. 603, 612 (2003). Thus, some "infertile" persons may conceive without
any medical intervention. I will argue below for an understanding of infertility that includes not
only those medically unable to conceive, but also those socially unable to conceive. See infra note
29.
25.

See Gurmankin et al., supranote 5, at 62.

26.

See Noah, supra note 24, at 616.

27.

Id.
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services as a form of medical treatment, then it becomes apparent that
infertile persons receive less complete coverage of their medical needs
relating to reproductive health than do persons able to conceive without
medical intervention. In the context of sex discrimination law, courts have
recognized that insurance providing less comprehensive coverage for the
medical needs of one sex than it provides for the other's constitutes a form
of sex discrimination. 28 Thus, exclusions of coverage for ARTs from
otherwise comprehensive health insurance policies will have the effect of
discriminating against persons who are infertile.
C. Issues in Responding to Access Inequality

When considering inequalities in accessing ARTs and the opportunities
for parenthood that they allow, we can discern several dimensions of access
inequality. First, we may be concerned that-among persons who are
unable29 to conceive through sexual intercourse-inequalities in access may
be based on financial status, health or disability status, marital status, or
sexual orientation. Less obvious, but also disturbing, is the fact that
screening practices by ART programs and exclusions of ART services from
insurance coverage may function to relegate persons needing ARTs
to an
30
"naturally."
procreate
to
able
persons
to
compared
as
status
inferior
In the context of a symposium on the topic of regulating ARTs, we
might begin to think about possible responses to inequalities that exist in
access to ARTs. One possible response seems fairly straightforward: we
could seek to enact or change laws, regulations, or professional policies in
ways that assure greater equality of access to ART services unless some
sound reason exists to justify existing inequalities. Of course, reaching
agreement on what, if any, reasons might sufficiently excuse inequalities
28. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n, 462
U.S. 669 (1983) (finding, in the context of a sex discrimination in health insurance claim brought
under Title VII, that the appropriate standard required assessment of the relative comprehensiveness
of coverage provided to male and female employees).
29. In broad terms, individuals may be "unable" to conceive either as a result of a medical
inability to conceive-what we typically think of as infertility-or as a product of "social
infertility," the inability to conceive through sexual intercourse. Socially infertile persons would
include gays and lesbians who seek to become parents, as well as single, unattached heterosexuals
who wish to be parents.
30. 1 bracket the term "naturally" because I anticipate that a ready response to my point
about relegating medically and socially infertile persons to an inferior status will be that any
inequality experienced by those persons is somehow natural and not the product of social practices.
Without dismissing such a response, I simply hasten here to caution that historical practices of race
and sex discrimination were long justified as being based on biological and therefore "natural"
differences. We ought not simply accept, without careful scrutiny, "naturalness" justifications for
inequality.
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will be a challenge. Should we accept any restraints on access to ARTs? If
so, may restraints permissibly be based on the financial status of those
seeking services? On concerns about the future welfare of children who may
result from the use of ARTs? On the desire to accommodate the religious or
moral beliefs of providers of ART services?
While it seems improbable that any satisfactory single, one-size-fits-all
answer exists to these questions, it nonetheless seems desirable to try to
reach some agreement on an approach that can be applied across contexts to
different types of access inequality, rather than addressing access problems
piecemeal. Particularly with respect to denials of access based on personal
attributes of those seeking services, it may be useful to think broadly about
why any personal characteristics might disqualify one from relying on
medical and technological assistance to achieve parenthood.
Admittedly, efforts to address particular status-based access problems
have already been undertaken, with varying degrees of success. In some
instances where provider screening has led to denials of access, laws
prohibiting discrimination based on a particular trait, such as disability or
sexual orientation, have been brought to bear.3' Similarly, reform of the
laws granting legal protections to participants in assisted reproduction could
eliminate the inequalities those legal structures produce. For example, the
Uniform Parentage Act was revised in the year 2002 to make it clear that
sperm donors would not be treated as the legal fathers of children32resulting
from donor insemination, regardless of the mother's marital status.
By contrast, one step in the direction of a broader approach to
addressing status inequality can be seen in a recent statement by the Ethics
Committee of the American Society of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM).33
While accepting the basic premise that fertility programs should be free to
withhold services based on a belief that prospective parents present "serious
child-rearing deficiencies," the statement recognizes the risks of unjustified
discrimination and unsubstantiated judgments of parental fitness. 34 To

31. Cf Benitez v. N. Coast Women's Care Med'l Group, Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2003) (finding that a lesbian's state law antidiscrimination claim against physician for
refusal to provide her with fertility services was not preempted by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA)); see generally Coleman, supra note 15 (discussing potential applicability of
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)).
32. The Comment to Section 702 of the revised Uniform Parentage Act states that
exempting sperm donors from legal paternity only when the recipient is a married woman "is not
realistic in light of present ART practices and the constitutional protections of the procreative rights
of unmarried as well as married women." See Uniform Parentage Act § 702 (2002), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulcframe.htm.
33. See The Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, ChildRearingAbility and the Provision of Fertility Services, 82 FERTILITY & STERILITY 564 (2004).
34.

Id. at 565.
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minimize the risk of arbitrary, idiosyncratic, or illegal denials of services,
the Ethics Committee recommends that ART programs should avoid ad hoc
decisions and instead develop written policies and procedures calling for
joint decision making by program providers. 35 While we could debate
whether the ASRM statement reflects a desirable balancing of the interests
of infertile persons against medical providers' autonomy and whether
professional self-regulation is alone a sufficient response to access
inequalities, the statement at least reflects an initial step towards provoking
professional self-reflection regarding access inequalities.
Of course, changing providers' screening practices will not mitigate the
inequality that flows from excluding ART services from the coverage of
private insurance policies. Proposals to require insurers to include coverage
of fertility services in policies have been made and, in about a dozen states,
adopted.36 While such laws may effectively eliminate the discriminatory
impact that the exclusions have on infertile persons, they may indirectly
increase the chances of another form of inequality. An argument frequently
voiced against laws mandating that insurers cover particular benefits is that
such laws raise the cost of health insurance and thereby price some
employers and individuals out of the market for coverage. If mandated
benefits laws do contribute to an increase in the number of people who have
no insurance (an empirical question on which I stake no claim), then they
will exacerbate the already deeply disturbing inequality in our society that
exists between persons with and without health insurance coverage. 37 Thus,
we begin to see how enhancing equality along one axis (equalizing the
coverage that fertile and infertile persons receive for their reproductive
health needs) may diminish equality along another (magnifying disparities
in access to health care generally between persons with insurance and those
without). When confronting inequality tied to resource constraints, we must
be particularly careful to avoid a "squeezing the balloon" effect.
III. UNBIASED TREATMENT IN RESOLVING DISPUTES RESULTING FROM THE
USE OF

ARTS

So far this Article has focused on inequities among individuals in their
relative abilities to achieve access to ART services, and inequalities
35.

Id. at 567.

36.

Cf Noah, supra note 24, at 616-17.

37. On the other hand, some empirical evidence does indicate that providers transfer more
embryos to patients in states that do not require insurance coverage. See Noah, supra note 24, at
626-27. If so, mandating coverage may reduce the substantial costs associated with multifetal
pregnancies and multiple births. Moreover, decreasing the number of multiple births may lower the
number of children with birth defects, thereby enhancing equality.
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between infertile and fertile individuals in their abilities to freely achieve
parenthood. In this Part, the focus shifts to scenarios that exist once ARTs
have been used and something has gone awry. Perhaps, for example,
circumstances have changed for the prospective parents, as circumstances
often do, or perhaps, more dramatically, a provider of ART services has
made a mistake that leads to confusion of parentage. When the use of ARTs
leads to disputes between the participants in the process, the law is often
deployed to resolve disputes or clarify relationships. The extent to which the
legal frameworks employed display biases presents another dimension of
potential inequality worthy of exploration.
One type of dispute that has resulted in litigation arises when couples
employ IVF to create embryos and the two intending parents disagree over
whether to continue the reproductive process before an attempt at
implantation occurs. Courts called upon to resolve these "frozen embryo"
disputes 38 between the intended mother and intended father struggle with
how to balance the competing interests at stake, 39 and commentators have
suggested how this struggle implicates equality concerns.
For example, an article written by Professor Judith Daar recognizes the
potential for inequality between fertile and infertile women lurking in these
cases and proposes an approach to resolving disputes regarding the
disposition of frozen embryos that seeks to equalize the reproductive
freedom of fertile and infertile women early in the pregnancy process.40
Daar argues that courts' presumption in favor of the party seeking to avoid
procreation may leave infertile women who have contributed to the creation
of frozen embryos with less reproductive autonomy than their physically
pregnant counterparts, who have sole authority to determine whether to
continue the reproductive process. 4 1 To avoid this inequality, Daar proposes

38. Conceivably, the dispute will not always involve a frozen embryo, but could arise in the
brief interval between the in vitro fertilization and transfer of the resulting embryos to the women.
Cf Judith F. Daar, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the PregnancyProcess:Developing an
Equality Model to Protect Reproductive Liberties, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 455, 467 (1999) (suggesting

such a scenario).
39. Some courts indicate that a balancing of interests need occur only if the intending
parents have not previously entered into an agreement that would settle the dispute. See Davis v.
Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993)

(balancing equitable

interests when no agreement regarding disposition existed); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y.
1998) (holding that preconception agreements between the parties contributing genetic material to

the IVF process are presumptively enforceable); but see A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass.
2000) (refusing on public policy grounds to enforce a term in a fertility clinic's consent form that
would require a man to become a father against his will).
40.

See Daar, supra note 38.

41. Id. at 457 ("A woman using ART should have the same right to control the fate of her
unimplanted embryo as she would have to control her early fetus in a traditional pregnancy.
Anything less would deny women undergoing ART equal protection of precious reproductive
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an approach that would give infertile women
control over embryos for a
42
limited period of time following conception.
Daar's article makes careful arguments and presents a thoughtful
proposal about how to ensure equality of reproductive freedom for fertile
and infertile women, but it is less attentive to an alternative inequality
concern. Gender equality provides a different lens for examining a point in
the procreative process at which no physical pregnancy exists, so that issues
of female bodily integrity and autonomy are less salient.43 One might argue
that, rather than comparing women who have gone through the IVF process
and created unimplanted embryos to women in the first trimester of a
physical pregnancy and then proposing equal treatment of these two groups,
one should instead compare these women to men who have gone through
the same process. Thus, one might argue that the egg contributor and sperm
contributor are similarly situated prior to implantation and therefore should
be treated equally, with neither being favored on the basis of gender, in any
legal framework for resolving these disputes. This approach essentially
reflects a "sameness" approach to advancing gender equality, 44 and is
arguably consistent with a gender-neutral allocation of parental decisionmaking rights regarding born children.4 5
By contrast, Professor Ruth Colker suggests an alternative approach,
reflecting a "difference" model of gender equality, to dealing with frozen
embryo disputes.4 6 Highlighting the greater stress and physical invasion
endured by women in the IVF process and the reality that women have a
limited supply of eggs and face declining fertility over time, Colker
proposes that courts facing frozen embryo cases should presumptively
award embryos to women who wish to implant them. In this view, achieving
an equitable result requires "recognizing the ways in which men and women
47
are not similarly situated with respect to reproduction."
My point here is not to endorse one approach to resolving frozen

liberties.").
42.

Id. at 467-69.

43. See Ruth Colker, Pregnant Men Revisited or Sperm is Cheap, Eggs are Not, 47
HASTINGs L.J. 1063, 1068 (1996) (stating: "When a case does not involve a pregnantperson, then
the rights protected by Roe are not implicated.").
44. The "sameness" versus "difference" debate among feminists regarding the appropriate
approach to advancing gender equality is described well in Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminist
Legal Theory, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 13, 15-19 (2005).
45. Cf Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895-96 (1992)
(distinguishing the nature of a father's parental rights before and after birth).
46.

See generally Colker, supra note 43.

47.

Id. at 1066.
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embryo disputes over another; instead, it is to illustrate how the equality
issues embedded in a particular type of ART-related dispute may be framed
in multiple ways and come into tension. Courts, policy makers, and
commentators who are attentive to equality issues should think carefully
about what weight to give to biological imbalances between men and
women in the reproductive process, and whether gender-neutral or genderfocused decision tools will best further equality. For example, in the
different context of resolving questions about the legal parentage of children
already born through the use of ARTs, Professor Marjorie Shultz has argued
that gender-neutral criteria are necessary to counterbalance men's relative
weakness in nurturing offspring in the reproductive process and thereby to
reinforce men's decisions to care for children. 4 8 "By adopting a sex-neutral
criterion such as intention, the law would partially offset the biological
49
disadvantages men experience in accessing child-nurturing opportunities.
Nor is gender equality necessarily the preeminent challenge in crafting rules
for establishing parentage following ART mistakes. In her contribution to
this Symposium and elsewhere, Professor Leslie Bender has demonstrated
how courts' analyses regarding parentage in cases where embryos have been
misimplanted have been skewed by race-biased and sex-biased
assumptions.50 Thus, when policymakers and judges are called upon to
allocate decision-making authority or determine parentage in disputes that
arise following the use of ARTs, they should be mindful of the variety of
ways that the equality of the parties may be at stake.
IV. ISSUES OF SOCIAL INEQUALITY RAISED BY TRAIT SELECTION PRACTICES

The preceding Parts have suggested how equality issues may
materialize
when
individuals seek technological
assistance
in
reproduction-focusing first on participants' access to ART services and
then on how the law resolves disputes among participants arising from the
provision of services. This Part, by contrast, concentrates not on whether
participants in the ART process are treated equally, but instead on the risk
that using ARTs may contribute more broadly to material inequality in the
conditions of persons' lives. This risk exists to the extent that the use of
ARTs is coupled with parental selection of traits for the prospective child.
Trait selection practices in current use raise the concern, but the equality

48. See generally Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based
Parenthood:An Opportunityfor Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REv. 297.
49.

Id.at 303.

50. See generally Leslie Bender, Genes, Parents,and Assisted Reproductive Technologies:
ARTs, Mistakes, Sex, Race & Law, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2003).
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concerns may loom even larger when genetic enhancement technologies
become a reality.
A. Trait Selection Practices Today

Several practices, including prenatal genetic screening, preimplantation
genetic diagnosis, and sperm sorting, are available to prospective parents
who seek to exercise some control over whether to bear a child with
particular traits. Among these, prenatal genetic screening coupled with
abortion is, in theory, an option in any pregnancy, whether or not the
pregnancy is achieved by use of ARTs. By contrast, preimplantation genetic
diagnosis is conducted following IVF and prior to implantation. These two
trait selection methods simply allow parents to decide-once a particular
trait of a fetus or embryo has been identified-whether to continue or
terminate the reproductive process with respect to that fetus or embryo.
Sperm sorting techniques, on the other hand, seek to enable prospective
parents to choose the sex of their offspring prior to conception and require
the use of (at least) artificial insemination.51
Some have argued that trait selection practices in current usage may
increase inequality in our society by allowing parents to select the sex of
their offspring or to select against disability in their offspring. For example,
Adrienne Asch, one of the most prominent and thoughtful voices
articulating the disability rights critique of prenatal genetic testing,
expresses concern about the message that prenatal screening and selective
abortion send regarding the dignity and worth of persons with the selectedagainst disabilities, and the resulting devaluation of persons with disabilities
in our society. 52 She argues: "[R]esearchers, professionals, and
policymakers, who uncritically endorse testing followed by abortion, act
from misinformation about disability, and express views that worsen the
53
situation for all people who live with disabilities now or in the future."
The concern exists because of the relative speed with which prenatal testing
practices have proliferated in our society and the accompanying lack of
careful thought regarding its implications for social equality.
Sex selection practices by prospective parents raise similar concerns

51. See Kelly M. Plummer, Comment, Ending Parents' Unlimited Power to Choose:
Legislation Is Necessary to ProhibitParents' Selection of Their Children'sSex and Characteristics,
47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 517, 520-22 (2003).
52. See Adrienne Asch, Disability Equality and Prenatal Testing: Contradictory or
Compatible?, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 315 (2003). For a volume addressing this concern from a
variety of perspectives, see PRENATAL TESTING AND DISABILITY RIGHTS (Erik Parens & Adrienne

Asch eds., 2000).
53.

Asch, supra note 52, at 316-17.
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regarding gender equality. These concerns are relatively muted in the
United States today, where reliable sex selection techniques remain fairly
uncommon and appear to be employed primarily for purposes of "family
balancing" (i.e., seeking the presence of both female and male children in a
family). 54 In other societies, such as India and China, where a much greater
cultural emphasis is placed on bearing male heirs, sex selection techniques
result in the aborting of many thousands-perhaps millions-of female
fetuses each year." In these contexts, sex selection techniques raise stark
concerns about the material inequality of women in a patriarchal society.56
While epidemic abortions of female fetuses in some societies raise
obvious gender equality concerns, they also produce tension among
advocates of greater gender equality as to the best strategy for addressing
the inequality of women. While many Western feminists assert that
maintaining reproductive choice (and hence the option of sex selective
abortions) is of central concern for women's social equality, feminists in
India have decried selective abortion of female fetuses and have
successfully lobbied for legal prohibitions on what they consider further
oppression of women. 57 Thus, even those sharing concerns about the
ramifications of trait selection practices for the social equality of persons
bearing the traits commonly selected against may have difficulty agreeing
on how best to alleviate that inequality.
B. TraitSelection Practiceson the Horizon

Today, prospective parents are fairly limited in the choices they can
make to select the traits of their offspring. They can seek to identify certain
genetic traits either of a fetus during pregnancy or of an unimplanted
embryo following IVF and then choose whether to continue the
reproductive process with respect to that fetus or embryo. In other words,
the stance of prospective parents today is largely reactive 58 to information

54. See Rob Stein, A Boy for You, A Girlfor Me: Technology Allows Choice, WASH. POST,
Dec. 14, 2004, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A620672004Dec13.html.
55.

See generally Gautam N. Allahbadia, The 50 Million Missing Women, 19 J. ASSISTED

REPROD. & GENETICS 411 (2002).

56. See Farhat Moazam, Feminist Discourse on Sex Screening and Selective Abortion of
Female Foetuses, 18 BIOETHICS 205, 206 (2004); see also Uma Girish, For India's Daughters, A
Dark Birth Day, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Feb. 9, 2005, available at http://www.csmonitor.
com/2005/0209/p 11 sO 1-wosc.html.
57.

See Moazam, supra note 56, at 206.

58. Sperm sorting, by contrast, presents an opportunity for prospective parents to influence,
rather than simply react to, a trait of their desired offspring. See id.
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about a limited set of traits. As scientists proceed to identify the function of
an ever greater number of genes, however, it is likely that parents in the near
future will have access to information about far more genetic traits. More
fundamentally, the predicted (but less imminent) development of gene
therapy technologies that would permit correction of disease- or disabilitycausing genes and enhancement of other genetic characteristics, such as
intelligence, athleticism, or behavioral traits, may permit prospective
parents to manipulate the genetic makeup of their offspring. The availability
of such technologies, particularly enhancement technologies, will pose both
risks and opportunities for social equality.
We cannot today predict with confidence whether a future capacity to
enhance genetic characteristics will lead to a more or less equal society, but
a small cottage industry of scholars and commentators has already been
busy exploring the various potential ramifications of genetic interventions,
among them the implications for equality and justice in society.59 While this
Article does not seek to recount the extensive discussions of the distributive
justice implications of genetic treatment and enhancement, even a cursory
review of the literature reveals significant disagreements. Some scholars
suggest the possibility that genetic interventions may be used to improve the
functioning and lot of those who would otherwise find themselves at the
bottom of the social and economic ladder. 60 In this view, trait selection by
genetic enhancement or treatment technologies 6' may lead to a more just
society by, in Rawlsian terms, improving the position of those least well off.
Also voiced, however, is a less sanguine view highlighting our
society's current inability to ensure equitable access to existing health care
technologies and predicting that genetic interventions--once developedwill be financially accessible only to those individuals who are already the
most well off.62 To wit, rather than ameliorating existing social inequalities,

59. For a thought-provoking and influential book-length discussion of these issues by a
group of leading bioethicists, see ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS
AND JUSTICE (2000). For a sampling from the burgeoning literature on this question, see Michael H.
Shapiro, Does Technological Enhancement of Human Traits Threaten Human Equality and
Democracy?, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 769 (2002); Mark A. Hall, Genetic Enhancement, Distributive
Justice, and the Goals of Medicine, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 669 (2002); Arti K. Rai, Genetic
Interventions: (Yet) Another Challenge to Allocating Health Care, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 657
(2002); Peter H. Huang, Herd Behavior in Designer Genes, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 639 (1999);
Kean Birch, Beneficence, Determinism and Justice: An Engagement with the Argument for the
GeneticSelection of Intelligence. 19 BIOETHICS 12 (2005).
60. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 59, at 813 (pointing out the potential of technological
enhancement "to even out nature's hierarchial roughness").
61.
Debate also exists with respect to whether there exists a meaningful moral distinction
between "treatment" and "enhancement." See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 59, at 104-56.
62.

See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 59, at 809 (suggesting that distributing enhancement
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genetic intervention technologies will have the effect of exacerbating those
inequalities and contributing to a less just society. In this view, society faces
the prospect that the extant financial disparities in access to ARTs discussed
in Part II will simply be replicated with respect to the allocation of gene
therapy services, with an intensified effect when genetic alterations are at
issue. If the problem is financial disparities in access to trait selection
services, then an equality-enhancing cure is less than clear. The alternative
of providing funding to ensure equality of access regardless of wealth seems
sadly laughable in light of our society's current unwillingness to provide
equality of access to even basic health care services. And the alternative of
regulating or limiting the availability of trait selection services in order to
avoid the material inequality that may flow from their free availability on
the market may act to limit the exercise of individual liberties, and perhaps
produce inequalities of access along other axes.
Certainly, this sketching of views regarding the possible equality and
justice implications of future trait selection practices does not begin to
plumb the depth of the issues that genetic intervention technologies will
pose. However, it suggests yet another dimension of the equality issues that
ARTs are likely to pose in the near future. Questions about ramifications of
trait selection technologies for social equality must be raised and addressed
carefully while we are still scanning the horizon.
V. CONCLUSION

A central purpose of this Article has to been to propose a framework
for thinking about the various ways in which the development and
proliferation of ARTs may raise issues of inequality, whether they be
questions of material and social inequality or questions of unequal treatment
at the hands of the state or private actors. Developing this framework,
however, also serves to highlight the potential for tensions among various
dimensions of equality. For example, efforts to expand and equalize the
exercise of individual liberties may be at odds with attempts to address
social inequality and avoid its exacerbation by regulating or otherwise
decreasing trait selection practices. Similarly, as the discussion of the frozen
embryo cases demonstrates, the possibility exists that the equality issue
raised in a particular context may be characterized in competing terms.
While precluding neat answers to the equality questions that ARTs
raise, recognition of these tensions presents the opportunity for scholars and
policy makers in this field to think carefully about whether any proposed
regulation of ARTs might accommodate competing equality concerns or
characterizations of equality. If competing equality concerns cannot be
resources via market mechanisms would increase socioeconomic inequality).
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accommodated, the challenge becomes to assess which aspect of equality it
is most important to advance in the particularsetting. In sum, my hope is
that this brief examination will stimulate scholars, policy makers, and
service providers in this field to adopt a wide-angle view of the many
dimensions of equality at play in the provision and regulation of ARTs.

